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MACROECONOMIC TRIIIEMA AND
MONETARY POIICY IN NIGERIA
mobility forsmoll open economies.

e

L

More often thon not, the monetory
outhorities ore mondoted ond
expected to ochieve oll the three

policy gools, o developmenl
which hos become even more

q

dif f icult given current

developments regording the
copitol occounts.
A4OSES KPUGHUR

ruE

Direcloa Monelory PoLy Deportmenl
Centrcl Bonk ol Nigeno
4lh Moy. 2015

I.

INTRODUCTION

The choice of o monetory policy

regime is often influenced by o
mix of underlying economic
f

undomentols ond politicol

chorocteristics. Sliglitz (2002) wos
right in suggesting thot sound

economics depends

on

excellent politics; the
oppropriote choice being cost
ogoinst the bockdrop of
compeling ond of ten
diometricol objectives, public
interest ond economic
fundomentols, which in turn ore
o product of increosing finonciol
globolizotion, competitiveness
ond the degree of openness.

ln the lost l0 yeors, Nigerlo's
externol reserves position hos

improved remorkobly,
occomponied by relotively high
copitol inflows, especiolly, of
portfolio investment. During the
period, the country mode
significont in-roods into globol
copitol morkets with sovereign
bonds ond privote issues by

finonciol instilutions. These
developments reflect, in port,

the globol trend loword greoter
integroiion of commerce ond

finonce oflen refened
'finonciol integrotion'.lt

o meosure of

is

to

os

seen os

'openneSs'.

nY,
lncreosed openness or finonciol
integrotion hos produced positive
results, olbeit with significont risks
porticulorly, for economies with illequipped finonciol morkels or
weok intermediotion copocity. As
cunent ond copitol occounts ore
being liberolized, globol lrode ond
finonciol morkels ore ropidly
exponding. The ossocioted flows
hove increosed ond become on
importont source of vulnerobilities
in smoll open economies.
lncreosed openness offers mony
odvontoges lhrough trode ond
the ossocioted sociol ond culturol
exchonges, but olso conies with it
certoin costs including generoting
own shocks to the domestic policy
environmenl. For monetory policy,
such complicotions con be quite
severe. This is becouse, increosed
copilol freedom could eosily
undermine policy independence
or trigger exchonge role inslobility
- free mobility of copitol would
require either more flexibility of the
exchonge rote (which could leod
to instobility of the exchonge rote)
or if lhe centrol bonk chooses to
defend lhe exchonge rote ot oll
cosl, it could only do so
successf ully ot o very high costl ln

effect, f ree copilol mobility
complicotes the optimizotion
problem focing the centrol bonk.
Aiming to simultoneously ochieve
low inflotion, low interest rote ond
o stoble exchonge rote is olmost

on impossible tosk in on
environment of free copitol
3

This chollenge is
refened to in the literoture voriously
os the 'monetory policy trilemo'
'impossible trinily"unholy trinity',
etc. lt is the monetory policy
mokeas nightmore!

The Centrol Bonk

of Nigerio,

like

to this
chollenge. Conducting monetory
policy to ochieve oll three
o b jectives dictoted by its
others, is not immune

mondote hod never been more
chollenging thon it wos in recent
yeors, thonks to more copitol flows.

The situolion presents the Bonk with
tough monetory policy choices. As

the economy becomes

more
open to copitol movement, hord
choices such os stobilizing the
exchonge rote or keeping interest
rote low; inflotion or exchonge rote

os the nominol onchor for
monetory policy or o move
towords restricting the copitol
occount or mointoining its obility to
undertoke monetory policy ore
criticol policy considerotions. The

difficulty of simulloneously

ochieving lhese objectives hos
been well documented in the
exlonl literoture rooted in the
Mu ndell-Fle

mming model.

Mundell (1963) first identified the
impossibility of ochieving the three

policy gools ot lhe some time
when he demonstroted lhe effect
of o smoll open economy's choice
of exchonge rote regime ond

copitol

mo

bility (occount)

fromework on its monetory policy
independence. Monelory policy
independence, the centrol bonk's
obility lo lower interest rotes ond/
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or increose money

supply

(exomple by quontilolive eosing),
lo stimulole the economy when
required is key to the centrol
bonk's mondote of price stobility.
lndependently ond porollel to

Mundell, Flemming

(1962)
developed o model of lhe some

policy choice foced by

smoll

open economies.

Other econo mists ;uch os
Obstf eld ond Toylor (1998)

APRIL

Nominol rigidities, porticulorly,

The Mundell triongle optly
depicts the ideol policy

price ond woge inflexibility, in the
post-Ww ll ero mode it difficult 10

environmenl in which these three
mocroeconomic gools co-exist

CONCEPIUAT BASIS OF
TRITEMAAA

moinloin externol bolo nce
without obondoning the sociol
ond 'politicolly conect' gools of

consequences. Fischer (2001)
described the choice omong the

Using on extension of the
lnveslment/Sovings-Liquidity-

three mocroeconomic policies os
the'lmpossible Trinity'.

(lS-LM)
model by including the bolonce
of poyments (BoP), the MundellFlemming model provides the

thot of the
three policy choices - o sloble
exchonge rote (by hoving in
ploce o fixed exchonge regime),
low interest rote ond o sovereign
monetory policy (by odding

monetory policy to other

economic policy tools) - policy
mokers in open economies con
only ottoin two ot ony one time.

lobour rights. This wos becouse

the octivities of lobour

unions

mode woges sticky downwords
ond in so doing, slimulotes
inflotion when full employment is
public policy. Lindblom {l 949)
tells us thot continuous pressure
on the exchonge rote noturolly
follows in this situotion ond policy
octions 1o mointoin stoble
exchonge rote will ultimotely

engender countercyclicol
deflotion ond reflotion.

Preference/Money

conceptuol f romework for
onolyzing lhe'Mocroeconomic
Trilemmo'.ll is on open economy
represenlolion of the lS-LM curve
ond portroys the short-ru n
relotionship between on open
economy's nominol exchonge
rote, interest rote, ond oulput.

The model enobles us to

ln this presentotion, we

will
ottempt on explorotion of how the

Flgure
The Mundell

mocroeconomic trilemmo
in f lue nces monelory policy

(Figure 1 ).

Consider the three sides, o, b ond
c of the triongle; it is only possible
to hove only two of lhe policy
gools. Side o offers the possibility
of o fixed exchonge rote with
free copltol flows; side b offers
onother possibility of free copitol

lows ond monetory policy
independence (i.e. sovereign
f

monetory policy); while side c
offers the combinotion of fixed
exchonge rote ond monelory
policy independence.

Recoll thot the investmentsovings function, lS curve is
downword sloping becouse it
represents the locus of points of
equilibrium in the reol (i.e. nonfinonciol) economy where totol
spending (consumer spending +
plonned privole investment +
government purchoses + nel
exports) is equol to totol oulpui
(equivolent to reol income, Y).
The lower the domestic interest
role, the higher be lhe demond
for credit ond hence, higher
investment ond outpul. Similorly,
the higher the rote of domestic
interest rote, the higher ihe level

I
lrlongle

trcc Cqpllol ;lowt

choices ond octions in proclicol
terms. Following this introduction,
the rest of the poper is structured
os follows. Seclion 2 exomines in
greoter deloils key conceptuol
lssues. . Afterthis, we will review the
historicol epochs of the lrilemmo,
f

ollowed by contemporory

counlry experiences in monoging

the trilemmo. Section

exomines the chollenge

five

20I4

THE

2.

jobs for oll ond unrestricted

The key contention is

DECEMBER

demonstrote thol on economy
connot simultoneously moinloin
o fixed exchonge rote, free
copitol movement, ond on
independent monetory policy.

trilemmo in Nigerio while in the
finol section; we present the
conclusions of the poper.

described the problem of choice
in which individuol countries moy
choose two of the three gools
bosed on their own experiences
ond economic growth needs os
the'Mocroeconomic trilemmo'.
The term trilemmo is derived from
the well-known word dilemmo
ond is ot once intuitive ond
colchy. According to Monkiw
(201 0) it describes o situotion in
which someone foces o key
choice omong deodly three
options, eoch of which comes

with dire inevitoble

-

;lx

d Exchongc Roi6

of the
4

Sovcrclgn Monclory Pollcy
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of bonk occounts (sovings)
bolonces ond therefore, the Iower
tl^: level of investment ond
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Flgure 2

lS-U -BoP

output.

Algebroicolly,

-

l

odel

ls1

the

lnvestment-

Sovings (lS) relotionship

LM

IS

is

represented by
Y=C(Y-T(Y))+l{r) + G + NX(Y)
Where:
Y represents oggregote income;
C (Y-T{Y)) represe nts privote
consumer expenditure os on
increosing function of disposoble
income;

LMl

FE

iw

l{r) represent privoie
investment os

o

f ixed
decreosing

unction of the reol interest role;
G represents government (fiscol)

f

Y

expenditure on both

consumption ond investment
goods ond services; ond
NX(Y) represents net exporls os o
decreosing function of income.

On the other hond, the Liquidity

Preference theory i.e. the

demond for money theory shows
the Money Supply (LM) curve.
which depicts the locus of interest
rotes ond levels of reol income ot

which money morkel is ot
equilibrium. The liq u id ity

preference or demond for money
(i.e. to hold cosh bolonces insteod
of securities) is delermined by the
Tronsoctions, Precoutionory ond
Speculotive demonds for money.
Tronsoctions ond precoutionory
demonds for cosh bolonces
increose wlth income ond os they
increose, the interesl rote in the

money morket increoses.
Speculotive demond for cosh

bolonces is penolised by o rise in
interest rote; ond decreoses with
on increose in lhe rote of interesl.

The supply of money is
determined by Deposil Money

M/P=L(i,Y)
Where:

M/P represents reol money
supply; P represenls the price
level (inflotion rote); L represents
the reol demond for money {o
function of lhe interest rote i ond
the level of reol income

Y)

curve, FE, depends on the

degree of finonciol integrotion of

lhe country. Where there

is

copitol control, lhe FE curve will
slope upwords; where perfect
copitol mobility exists, the FE
curve is horizontol, os in figure 2
obove, ot o level of the domestic
interest rote equol to the level of
lhe world interest rote. But where
there is less thon perfect copitol
mobility, lhe slopes of both the lS
curve ond the FE curves will
depend on the exchonge rote.
Beor in mind thot the groph is o

three-dimenslonol spoce

LM curve is upword sloping

mocroeconomic oggregotes:
interest rote. income. ond the

becouse the demond for money
inversely reloted to interest rote,
while lhe supply is ossumed to be
interest inelostic. Mothemoticolly,
lhe LM curve con be stoted os

exogenously determined within
the model.
is

ln flgure 2, i on the verticol oxis
represenl domeslic reol interest
role, while Y on the horizontol oxis
represents reol outpul in on
economy. The slope of the BoP

Bonks (DMBSJ through their credit

creotion ond lhe centrol bonk
through its monetory policy. The

ond distinct exchonge role
regimes which o smoll open
economy like Nigerio con odopt:
o fixed or flexible exchonge rote
regime. Eoch choice hos
implicotions for monetory policy.
We would ossume lhot the
nominol domestic money supply

involving

the three

exchonge rote.

is

ln the context of the MundellFlemming model depicted in
figure 2, there ore two possible
5

Under o Flxed Exchonge Role
Reglme
The centrol bonk under o fixed

exchonge role regime

onnounces o foreign exchonge
rote e (the pority rote) for lhe

domestic currency. At the
onnounced rote e. the Bonk,
offers to sell ond buy ony omount

of the domestic currency

required in the foreign exchonge
morket. Under the circumslonce,
lhe exchonge rote is
exogenously determined but lhe
nei foreign exchonge flow, the
BoP, is endogenously derived.

When the demond for lhe
domestic cunency (in the foreign

exchonge morket) exceeds
supply, the centrol bonk would
buy foreign currency using the
domestic curTency to mitigote
the pressure in the morket. lf the
demond for foreign currency
exceeds supply, the centrol bonk
wou ld buy the do mestic

APRIL _ DECEMBER
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currency, using foreign curency
ln order to eliminote the pressure
in the morket. ln both instonces,

the lorgel is to keep the
exchonge rote of the preonnounced

noted lhot

level. lt should be
ot the onnounced

exchonge rote torgel, there is on
ossocioted BoP position, either o
surplus or deficit.
lf the

exchonge rote torgel results

in o consislent BoP surplus, the
money supply in the domestic
economy will rise. necessiloting

the need for the centrol bonk 10
sterilise the excess liquidity by
reducing its holdings of domestic
securities (bonds). A consislent
BoP deficitwill coll forlhe opposite
oction (i.e. increosing its holdings
of domestic bonds) by lhe centrol
bonk. These octions will suffice in
themselves if there is no finonciol
integrotion. meoning thot there is

copitol control (the copitol

occount of the country is closed).
ln o siluotion of free copitol
mobility, o sterilisotion exercise will

trigger on offsettin g

of

internotionol copitol f lows.

An increose in

govern ment

expenditure, G, under o fixed
exchonge rote regime would shifi
the lS curve to the right to lS I
which would couse o rise in the
domestic inlerest rote. Given free
copitol mobility, on increose in the
domeslic interest rote would
ottroct co pito I inf low ond
stlmulote on oppreciotion of the
domestic currency (exchonge
rote). ln response, the centrol
bonk would hove to increose the
supply of the domestic currency in

order for the morkel lo moinloln

Where the government
controcts its fiscol progrommes
by reducing expendilure, G, the
lS curve will shift downwords to
the left while the LM curve will
shift downwords to the left to
restore the exchonge rote of the
onnounced level ond interest
rote ot the equilibrium level. This
oction would leod to o foll in the
level of output.

reverse developments ond
policy responses will opply.

When o smoll open economy
moinloins o tlxed exchonge role
regime ond hee cdpildl mobillly,
il cdnnol slm ullon eo usltl

molnloln monelory pollcy

independence becoute ll vill be
undble lo d Ye locdl lnlercsl

terno tio n o I co pitol flows
(inflows ond outflows) con be

ln

by o chonge

rdles owoy from lhe vorld

in

lnleretl ruleg

globol interest rotes. When such
chonge in flows does occur, the
monetory outhorities intervene in
the foreign exchonge morket to
mointoin the exchonge rote ot
the pre-onnounced level. An
lncreose in globol interest rotes
shifts the BoP curve, FE, upwords
ond couse copitol to flow
outwords in seorch of higher
returns. The outword flow of
copilol exerts pressure in the
u pwo rd direction on the
domestic currency, requking the
centrol bonk lo intervene by
buying the domestic currency
with foreign currency in order to
mointoin the exchonge rote ot

This is

orrongement becomes
impossible.

imperotive to no'te
flows
keep the LM curve dormont, ond
the outcomes ore determined by
the 1S-BoP interoction.
lt is

thot chonges in copitol

A Flexlble Exchonge Role
Regime

The exchonge rote

flexible
fromework

decreosing money supply, the
LM curve shifts upwords to the left
until it intersects the lS ond BoP

exc
is

ho

L
E'

BB

2
I'E

6

o

morkel determined.

ossumed ond net poyment flows

lsr
I

e under

nge role

Free copilol mobility is olso

tlgure 3:
An lncreose in Governmenl Spendlng under
o Fixed Exchonge Role

IS

becouse the

orbitroge ovoiloble in open
copitol morkets when o smoll
open economy is f inonciolly
iniegroted globolly ond the
simple interesl pority of o
credibie fixed exchonge rote

the pre-onnounced level. By

the exchonge rote ot the
onnounced level. To ochieve
thot, the centrol bonk would sell
the domes'tic currency (i.e. buying
foreign currency with domestic
currency). The increose in supply
of the domesiic currency would
shift the LM curve downwords to
the right of LM I to bring down lhe
interest rote ond releose the
pressure on the exchonge rote.
However, this octio n would

curves ol o level of interest where
the domestlc interest rote equols
the world interest rotes. Where
globol interest rotes foll below
the domeslic interest rote, the

increose the level of income

precipitoted

20I4

-1'r/

'
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zero, meoning thol the BoP curve

interest rote couses increosed
copitol inflows, ond the inflows

of

moke lhe locol currency stronger

government expenditure

Thus, on increose in globol interest
rotes shifts the BoP curve upwords

compored wit h f oreign

outwords in seorch of

curencies. On the olher hond,
the higher GDP increoses
spending on imports. tending to
moke the currency weoker.
Assuming the BoP curve is not os

copitol outflow exerls pressure on
lhe domestic currency in the
downword direclion {towords
depreciolion) which will boost nel
exports, NX. An increose in NX
under the influence of exchonge
rote chonge will couse the lS

ossuming thot copitol mobility is
relotively strong), the former
effect will dominole ond the
currency will become stronger.
The stronger exchonge rote olso
mokes foreign goods cheoper
compored with locol goods. This
encouroges greoler imports ond

reverses the process.
An increose in money supply will
shift the LM curve to the right ond
reduce domestic interest rotes
compored with globol interest
rotes. The increose in domestic
money supply exerts downword
pre ss u re on lhe domestic

into or out of the country equols

represenls zero

Bo lo

nce

Poymenls.

by the some morgin, ond sioys
there, cousing copitol to flow

opportunilies elsewhere (i.e.
copitol ogglomerotion). The

curve to shift outwords to the right
to intersecl the BoP ond the
unchonged LM curves where the
globol interest role equols the
domestic interest rote. A decline
in globol interest rotes would

generote o controry
development ond outcome.

When government expenditure,
G, increoses, under o flexible
exchonge rote regime with
perfect copitol mobility, it couses
the lS curve 10 shift outwords to the
right. The shifl results in both locol
interest rotes ond income (GDP)

ro rise. The increose in locol

steep os lhe LM curve

discouroges exports, so
exports become lower.

o

1,S

ne1

result of this chonge in
exchonge rote, the lS curve shifts
bock toword its originol locotion.
The stronger currency olso shifls
the BoP curve upword, os higher
levels of interest rote would now
be consistent with o zero
bolonce of poyments surplus in
the presence of the stronger
cunency exchonge rote. The LM
curve is noi ot oll offecled in the
shorl run. The net effect of oll this
is thot, if there is perfect copitol
mobility, the level of income of
the locol economy is unchonged

As

in

currency, relotive to foreign
currencies, becouse of the

outflow of copitol in response to
o decline in lhe domeslic inlerest
rote. A depreciotion of the
domestic currency mokes

domestic goods ond services
cheoper to non+esidents thus

increosing net exports,

NX.

lncreosed nel exports will couse
the lS ond the BoP curves to shift
to the right. The BoP curve will shift
to the right becouse with the
decline in domeslic interest rotes
ond the depreciotion of the
domestic currency, the level of
outpul would hove to increose to
moke the BoP bolonce zero. This
is reolized by the rightword shifl of
oll the three curves. LM. lS ond
BoP.

Under o flexible exchonge rote
regime with copitol mobility,
independent monetory policy

exchonge rote regime.
According to Aizenmon

to

(201 I ),

ochieve monetory policy
independence in o smoll open

I.Id

1,S1

mobile. A decreose

connot be ochieved olso os wos
the cose under the fixed

Flgure 4
An lncreoEe ln Govemmenl Spendlng undel
o tloollng Exchonge Rote

I

(i.e.,

from ils originol position but goes
up if copilol is less thon perfeclly

economy, finonciol integrotion
hos to be troded off lo ochieve
stoble exchonge rote stobility
{i.e. credible fixed exchonge

1

B

rote regime).

3. A HISTOR|CAI EVOLUTION Ot

BB

IHE MACROECOT{OMIC
IRITEAA'IAA

There hove been different stoges
in the globol monogement of the
mocroeconomic trilemmo. The

2
_li

-r/b

economic orgument for free
moveme n I of copilol is
essentiolly thot it con increose
economic efficiency {Bernonke,

7.
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2005). Under o regime of open
copitol occounts, sovings will flow
to the most productive investment
opportunities, without regord to

of

exchonge ogoinst other

counlri s. Under the gold

their locotion ond greoter
competition for copitol will

stondord system, the trilemmo
wos monoged by odopting the
fixed exchonge rote ond free
copitol m obility regim es,

deepen the finonciol morket in oll

f

couniries. Governments thol
borrow from ef icient globol
flnonciol morkets wlll be
f

compelled

to

mointoin debt

orf eiting monetory policy
independence. ln some

instonces, this choice posed o
chollenge to the ottoinment of

domestic mocroeconomic

sustoinobility ond domestic bonks
will be forced to odjust to or be
weokened by foreign finonciol
institutions.

stobilily. By lhe down of the 20th
century, securilies such os bill of

These merits, however, hove been
controverted (Stlglitz. I 974). Since

tronsoctions in mony courtries
ocross the world. High finonce
tronsoctions such os bonds ond
equity were quite common os

the Eost Asion finonciol

crisis of
/98, lhe politicol, sociol ond
economic costs of internotionol
1997

copitol movements

hove

become widely known thon the
benefits. Similorly, the gome of o
fixed exchonge rote regime hos

exchonge ond mojor
internotionol currencies were
wid e ly used in business

copitol

m

oved f reely,

internotionolly. As f ino ncio
centres emerged in differenl
cou ntries, f ino ncio I troding
spreod into well lntegroted
i

neiworks of globol finonce.

been disputed (Kenen, 2000). The
orguments ore lhot if the regime
imposes very tight consiroints on
monetory policy ond no single
country con successfully mointoin
o fixed exchonge rote, without
every other country doing lhe
some. lt is octuolly orgued thot the
benefits of o fixed exchonge rote

The gold stondord worked best in
o decentrolised world where BoP
o d ju stme
were
(Mundell,
outomotic
2000). ln the
period before the WW I , tensions

without free copitol mobilily thot
ollows for the flow of money
ocross notionol boundorles. lt is
olso orgued thot the world is not

gold stondord become subject
to their discretion. When the US

oreo;

centro lised money

regime connot be ottoined

on optimum currency

therefore, nolionol economies
ore vulneroble to osymmetric
shocks, ond mony connol cope

with them without chonging their
exchonge rofes. Thus, it is neither
wise nor reolistic to ochieve fixed
exchonge rotes globolly. Kenen
orgued thot when price stobility is

the principol objectlve of
monetory policy, using o

symmetricol inflotion-ro'te torget
moy be the leost expensive ond
most sensible woy to confer
credibility on monetory policy.
I 91 4, the mojor troding
powers pegged their currencies'
prices in terms of gold, ond thus,
implicitly, mointoined o fixed rote

Before

nt policies

emerged when the centrol
bonks of the .nojor econo'r.ies
become dominont ond the
efficiency ond stobility of the
Federol Reserve wos creoted in

I913,

il

creotion in o lorge open
economy ond d o mino'ted

internotionol finonce. Before
long, the US hod obout holf o'
globol monetory gold. moking
the dollor higher thon gold. By
the eorly 1930s, Britoin ond some
other counlries obondoned the

gold stondord, peggeo

exchonge rote ond free copiloi
mobility. Lobour unions emerged
os o sociol ond economic force
to chollenge lhe dominonce of
copitol in industriol economies.
Briioin ond other countries,
however, retu rn e d to the
internotionol gold stondord loter
in the I 930s with limited rekindling
of internoiionol copitol flows.
8

20]4

Weoknesses in the new system
helped to propogote the globol
depression which followed the

controction of oulput growth
the

US

in

in 1929.

Towords the end of lhe WW2, in
1944, tne Bretton Woods syslem
wos creoted os on internolionol

stondord for exchonging
notionol currencies. The

Internotionol Monetory Fund,
lMF, wos creoted to monitor the
exchonge rote of its member

countries ond lend reserve
currencies to those who hod
trode deficits.

One US dollor wos set to 35 oz. of
go d (buliion) ond othercountries
set tl"e porily of lheir currencies

lo the dollor on the

understonding thot the US dollor
would be fully bocked by gold.
Members ogreed to buy ond sell
US dollors so os keep their
currencies within I per cent of
the fixed dollor exchonge rote.
Under this system, the trilemmo
wos resolved by odopting o fixed
exchonge rote or odjustoble
peg) ond monetory policy
independence due to strict
limitotions on copitol mobility.
lndeed, members we re
encouroged to institute copital
controls to mointoin externol
bolonce when foced with the

donger of destobilising'hot'
money flows.

The Bretton Woods system of
internotionol monelory regime
foced chollenges o lmost
immediotely it wos estoblished
becouse the IMF wos not
odequotely funded to dischorge
its obligotion under the syslem.
When its resources were quickly
exhousted in the fkst few yeors,
the burden of globol monetory
stobilisotion ond lending wos
ossumed by the United Stotes. By

running BoP deficits, the US
become the source of globol
liquidity growlh. Countries
running BoP surpluses hod to buy
dollors to stobilise their exchonge
rotes. Up to obout 1958, the
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dollor wos the only convertible
ond reserve currency. The size of
the US deficits wos limited during

exchonge rote regime.
ln this ero, ony country thot hod

ore reodily occepted globolly.
The cunencies of mony olher

this time; there wos dollor scorcity

objectives hos hod o crises. lt hos

reserve currency. From 1958, the
size of the US poyment deficit
grew lorger ond lorger until the
system collopsed.

Mexico, Argentino, ond the
Europeon crisis following the
reunificotion of Eost ond West
Germony ond the Eost Asion
counlries (Puckelwold, 201 2).

countries, including Nigerio ore
not convertible ond even if they
were, they would hove little or no

A number of Europeon currencies

of lhe choice. policy mokers ond

ond mony Europeon countries
ho ppily ocquired dollors os

tried to choose oll three
been the cose with

Russio,

Despite the clority ond simplicity

become convertible ond the

countries storted being

concerned obout the glut of the
dollor; they storted reducing their
holding of the US currency. feoring
thot the dollors in their hold could
not be redeemed in gold. On
August 15, l97l . the US suspended
the convertibility of dollor lo gold.

l8

months loter, odvonced

economy countries flooted lheir
currencies independently. The
Bretton Woods system thus come
to on end (Gowo, 1 983).

ln the post Bretton Woods ero,
odoption of o flexlble exchonge
rote regime is the norm omong
o dvo n ced industrlolised
counlries. Copitol mobility omong

odvonced economies qnd

in

some emerging morket
economies hove grown very lorge
ond ropidly enobling lhem to
conduct independent monetory
policy {Obstfeld, Shombough,
ond Toylor 2005).

ocodemics continue

to live in

deniol. Probobly becouse there
ore insufficient empiricol studies
showing the limits of policy.
However,'public in te rest'

odvocotes ore often not
persuoded by the evidence
presented by empirics; becouse
odvococy is their vocolion!

4.

Different countries odopt different

United Stotes, Jopon, the EU ond
Conodo chose monetory policy

independence ond free copitol
mobility. while f looting their

currencies

(th

us

f

orf

eiting

exchonge rote stobility). On its
port, Chino mointoins closed
copitol occount in order to

ochieve monetory policy

independence ond exchonge
role stobility. According to

Monkiw

(20I O). Switzerlo nd
represents o third poth by ceding
monetory policy to the Europeon
Centrol Bonk (ECB) lo ochieve
free copitol mobility ond stoble

currencies. This scenorio

emerged since the end of the
Bretton Woods exchonge rote
system. Emerging morkel ond
developing country economies
thol ore commonly vulneroble to

internolionol economic
disturbonces hove, therefore,
contrlved dif f erent

configurotions of the trilemmo,
The oim of such countries is to
optimise or 'do the best they con
in their circumstonces', given the
policy trilemmo.

CONIEMPORAIY COUNIRY

EXPERIENCES IN

IHE

'IAANAGING

IRITEMMA

ln the immediote oftermoth of
the end of the Bretton Woods
system ond up to the I980s, most

lnternolionol copilol mobility hos

proved to be the most
conlroversio I of the policy
hoices. Bhogwoti (1998)
odvocotes f ree multiloterol trode
orgue ogoinst free internotionol
c

copitol lows or finonciol

developing countries odopted o
strotegy of fixed exchonge rotes,
monetory policy independence
ond closed copitol occounts.
Even those omong them thot

hod consideroble US dollor

lheir
view, it hos been ossocioted with

reserves, like the oil exporters,
feored copitol flight by domestic
economic ogents, ond so

efficiency, meosured by output

occounts.

However, mony developing

It is importont

f

inlegrotion, becouse,

in

deteriorotion in economic

ond employment growth.

countries thot ore destobilised by

strotegies in c hoosing their
monelory policy options. The

demond becouse lheir
economies ore smoll ond weok
ond connot support the

finonciol integrotion (Aizenmon,
Chinn ond lto, 2008) need
foreign sovings (copilol inflow) to
grow their economies ond lift
their populotions out of poverty.
Dif f erent countries hove,
theref ore. odopted different
strolegies in choosing omong the

three

inconsistent

mocroeconomic policy gools.

The monetisotion of economic
octivity is o recent phenomenon
in mony countries ond is still on
on-going phenomenon. Of lhe
cunencies, only the US dollor,
British pound sterling, euro,
Joponese yen ond Swiss Fronc

9

mointoined closed copitol

to remember thot
ot thot time, the communist bloc
n tries troded omongst
themselves, deoling with

cou

bolonce of poyments
odjustments in o different woys
such os counter trode, borler,

induslriol cooperotion ond
biloterol cleoring ogreements.

Lorge non-industriolised

countries of the period such os

lndio, lndonesio ond

Brozil

operoted plonned economic
systems ond so were nol exoctly

open economies. Despite
mointoining closed copitol
occounts, mony of lhe countries
bonowed heovily in the I 990s
from privole ond public sources

in the mojor finonciol morkets
which wos orgonised into the
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5.

ond London Club of creditor

countries.

debt overhong wos proof of
the inefficiency of closing copitol
morkets, ollhough it con be
orgued thot the sovereign debt

The

the euro zone since 2010 is
proof thot open morkets con olso
be inefficient. Throughout the
period, one chollenge foced by
mony developing countries wos

crisis in

exchonge rote misolignmenl

moinly through overvoluolion of
domestic currency which wos
possible under o fixed exchonge
rote regime.

After the period of f ixed
exchonge rote ond monetory

policy independence, there wos
o move towords more finonciol

integrotion. To monoge
internotionol copitol f lows,
developing ond newly
in d u s trio lis e d c o u n tries
mointoined sizeoble convertible
currency reserves. Privote copilol
morket operotors responded to
morkets thot hod substontiol
reserves becouse they hod the
copocity to beor copitol reversols.
The period coincided with the
peok of economic globolizotion
f rom the mid- I 980s. Newly
industriolised countries of Asio ond
Chino led the woy in holding lorge
foreign reserves, mostly in US

dollors. The resulting globol

imbolonces provided impetus for
low inflotion in the United Stotes
ond the creolion of innovotive

opened their stock exchonges to
foreign inveslors. Inlerestingly,
they mointoined on ef fective
currency peg by fixing their
currency relotive to the US dollor.

Section 2 of lhe Centrol Bonk of
Nigerio (CBN) Act 2007 lists the
objects of the CBN: ensuring
monetory ond price slobility;
issuo nce of legol te n der

their currencies convertible,

it possible for
spec u lotors to ottock lhe

This mode

currencies ond spreod crisis
through contogion ond ponic
("herding") ocross world finonciol

cenfres. ln the 1990s, lhree
"woves" of regionol currency
crises wos experienced: the ERM
Europe from 1992-3
crises

in
which f orced the United
Klngdom, Spoin ond ltoly to exit
rote
mechonism: the Lotin Americon
crises of 1994-5, sporked by the
devoluotion of the Mexicon peso
ond offected Argentino. Chile
ond others; ond the Asion crises,

the Europeon exchonge

ogoin sporked by lhe
devoluotion of the Thoi boht ond
wenl on to offect other South
Eost Asion countries. ln controst,

odvonced industriolised
countries broo d ly moved

towords stobilized exchonge
rotes ond high copitol mobility

with limited monetory
Since 2000, developing ond
emerging morket countries hove
converged towords monoged

From onother opprooch, egvo

the occumulotion of
unprecedentedly lorge

finonciol integrotion bocked by

(1998) suggested thot

internotionol reserve holdings

stop ond the deplh of the resulting

to the

internoiionol reserves reduced
both the probobility of o sudden

output collopse. Also, Aizenmon
ond Lee (2007) linked the lorge
increose in reserves holding to the
deepening finonciol integrotion

of developing countries;
evidence thol internotionol

reserve hoording served os o
meons of self-insuronce ogoinst

exposure

to

currency; moinleno nce of
exlernol reserves in sofeguording
lhe internotionol volue of the

legol tender currency:

promotion of o sound finonciol
system, octing os bonker ond

providing economic ond

finonciol odvice to the Federol
Governmenl. For most centrol
bonks, ochieving price stobility
which enloils; stoble exchonge
rote. low ond stoble inflotion ond
operoling on optimum interest
rote regime remoins the success

criterio for economic
monogemenl.

The Key Quegllons lor Nlgedon
Pollcy ,rioke6 ond lhe Counler
Focfuol l3!ue3

The key issues in ochieving
moc roecono mic policy in
Nigerio include:

. lf Inflotion concerns remoin

high, whot should monetory
policy do wilh exchonge rote
ond inlerest rote

independence.

os

derivotives.

THE

MACROECONO'IAIC IRITEMMA IN
NIGERIA

exchonge role flexib ility,
m onetory o uto nomy, ond

finonciol producls such

THE CHAI.I.ENGE OF

Mony of the newly industriolizing
countries in oddition to moking

(Aizenmon, Chlnn ond lto, 2008).
The globol finonciol crisis of 2007
forced these countries to od.iust

liquidity crisis which
followed, cousing the reol
exchonge rote (RER) ond
monetory policy to toke the
brunt. ln Nigerio, lhe bonking
system tottered ond ihe stock

morket melted under the
evidence.

sudden copitol

reversols.

l0

. Whot mechonisms of
exchonge rote monogemenl
would be 'oppropriote' to
ensure stoble rotes ond

.

.

should we torget the Nominol
or reol exchonge rote

How do we "control" interest

rotes in the foce

of

rising

Government deficits (Federol
ond Stotes) ond growing risks
focing the bonking system
Given the inflotion rote of 8.20
per cent os ot .Jonuory 201 5,

ond the ob.iective of
exchonge rote stobility,

.

should the CBN be loosening
monetory policy ot this time
Given the World Bonk ond the
IMF's coulion ogoinst the
"excessive" growih in credit,
ond the dongers it poses to
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system, low

inf lotion ond
interest rote, os well os

the bonking seclor, how do we
reconcile this with ihe recent

clomour for

o

reduction
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mointoin
rote

in

inleresl rotes?
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Irend ln Nlgerlo'r lnflotlon,
Exchonge ond lnleled Roleg

stoble exchonge
The Nigerion experience

of

the

o reol "imposslble trinity" con be
ef f ec tive exchonge rote
exploined from three different
oppreciqtion
ond epochs which ore discernible from
misolignment so thqt we do not following chorts.
repeot the mistoke of the

How do we ovoid

Whot should be the role of
Development Bonks in o time
like this in directing subsidized
credit to certoin sectors of the
economy

Do we hove enough
instruments to simultoneously
ensure o sound finonciol

1970s?

Flgure 7

Flgure 6
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Con Nlgerlo

Ac hleYe the
,rlocroeconomlc lrllemmo?

According

to

Krugmon

(1

999),

"the point is thot you con't hove il
oll: A country must pick two out of
three. lt con fix its exchonge role
but only by mointoining controls
on copitol flows (like Chino

todoy); it con leove copitol
movement f ree but reloin

monetory outonomy, but only by

letting the exchonge rote
fluctuote (like Britoin - or
Conodo); or it con choose to

leove copitol free ond stobilize
the currency, but only by
obondoning ony obilily lo odjust
inlerest rotes to fight inflotion or
recession {like Argentino)".

ln

Nigerio, like

in ony other

country, ochieving the trinity hos
remoined o herculeon losk.
However, every country slrives to
monoge lhe prices by socrificing
one out of the lhree from time io
time ond this depends on
developments within ond outsiCe
the economy. The Mf netclO,
Policy Committee (MPC I meet:;
bi-monthly to toke dec sior or
these voriobles ofter o thoror-rgf
exominotion ond onolysis of the

prevoiling

ecor,omic

development ond underlying

undomentors. The A4PC
determines the focus of .nc netory
policy especiolly in the corrtext of
ensuring price sto bil.t / os
entrenched in Section I 2 o' the
f

CBN

APRIL _ DECEMBER

Volume 38 No 4

Act 2002, while

the

monogement of exchonge rote
wos underthe control'the Boord of
the Bonk.

The mo.ior considerotion of the
CBN is thot o low nominol inlerest
rote regime is not only inconsistent
with o high inflotion environment
bul olso not feosible. There is ihe
need to creote compensotion for
owners of copitol so os 10 hedge

ogoinst on erosion of the

purchosing power induced by
high inflotion. Further, in periods
of high inflotion, lhe MPC will be
desirous of ochievirg low ond
stoble inflotion {price siobility)

ond, therefor:, would
unovoidobly roise 'l J monelory
policy rote ( cr rote thot
r

determines olher in (,rest r(to in
the economy) tc ;ignol o tight
monetory pol,cy s once. Tight
monetory policy stonce would
oulomoticolly influence morket
interest rotes in on upword
direction to cu40il oggregote

demond by reducing

ond investment
spending leoding ultimotely to o
decline in infloticn. Over time,
the low infloiion outcc,me will
expectedly elicit o lower interesl
rote regime ofter oll od.iustrnents
hove token p oce
consumption

o low
regi.ne in on

It is importonr to slcte thot

interest rote

environment of high inflotion will
elicit on inefficient use/ollocotion
of finonciol resorrr(:e;, os "suboptimcl "investr-nents whlch do
not promote econcmic giowth
will be undertoken. This is
becouse; there is n() incertive to
sove os it is better to consume oll
current income. ln on open
economy such os Nigerio, o high
domeslic price level relotive to
those of ihe troding portners

occomponied by

o

hig

h

ly

opprecioted domestic currency
vis-o-vis tro d ing portners
'currencies will:

Reduce lhe country's
competitiveness

internotionol morket
Discouroge ex po

in the
rts (in

Nigerio's cose, non-oil

exports)

Encouroge imports

Discouroge copitol flows
including foreign privole
investment, portfolio ond
other inflows

12
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Encc uroge copitol oulflows

Encouroge 'oreigi
excl-:;nge or )itr,lging irr I
eme .Jence f,f u thrivir.l
porc 3l mo'k:t l)r foreig.l
exctr tn,J3 O.'t,J
Deplt te,r.rt€ r.ol ei '..'.s
I;-s i. >,tl:r ; omeliorole si,ch

r:d zc,: .: levelopments, the
policymokers des rou: :! bringing
sonity to the eco:'i, ,,;.- system
will deploy the r' :,i;rrents
ovoiloble to them, sur: ; Js pursuit
of on interest rote policy thot
significontly moclerote inflotion,

encouroge domestic sovings,
encouroJe copitol inflows ond
miticot€. CoDllol oulflows.
6. CONCTUSTON

-his po;ler troced the origir ond

exo mined the lheorelicol
underpinning of the Trilemmo. lt

explo.ed the prociicol

chollenges of reolizing the trinity
omidst the growing finonciol
.nork()t )penness in o smoll open
econ()r,,y like Nigerio. A mojor
consitle'o1ion of the CBN is thol o
iow no, rin rl interest rote regime
is not orlly inconsistenl wilh high
inflotion environment but olso
not feosible. lt is importont lo
stote thoi o low interest rote
regime in on environment of high
inflotion will elicit on inefficient
use/o lloco tion of finonciol

resources, os "su b-optimol
" investments which do not

promote economic growth will
be undertoken. Overoll,
monetory policy moking would
continue to involve trode-offs.
Over the long term, it is expected

thot

progress with

complimentory fociors such os
fiscol discipline, infrostructure
ond finonciol slobility would
improve lhe effectiveness of
monetory policy in Nigerio.
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